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Hawks Versus Strategists Critics are divided
over the best policy by Ken Sanes Despite assurances from the Bush administration that the war is on schedule, there are a growing number of critics who are arguing that we have taken the wrong course. Opinion is divided into at least two camps that are saying very different things. Although these terms are very imperfect, let's call the two camps the Hawks and the Strategists. The first camp -- the Hawks -- has argued that the administration adopted a failed, Vietnam-like, strategy in which it was afraid to fully attack the Taliban and arm the Northern Alliance for victory. Apparently, the administration had at least three related reasons for not fully supporting the Northern Alliance: our key ally Pakistan opposed it; we feared that the victory of its minority tribesman would spark opposition from other tribes and we wanted to form a new Afghan government before the most important city, Kabul, was taken. It is widely believed that the criticisms from the Hawks has had its effect and the Bush administration has now switched into a higher intensity war that includes more support for the Northern Alliance. But the administration hasn't admitted that. Instead, some administration officials, as well as supporters, have claimed that it was really being pressured to step up the war because the media wanted more exciting coverage with definitive victories. This is one instance in which the media was receiving a bum rap. Much of the criticism of the administration was, in fact, coming from Republicans and conservatives, among them Bill Kristol of the Weekly Standard, columnist Charles Krauthammer and, most notably, Senator John McCain, who has called for the introduction of a large number of U.S. ground troops. Of course, this is hardly the first time a beleaguered administration has tried to blame the media for legitimate criticism of itself. But, there is also a second set of criticisms that are being made of administration policy which, if correct, are more devastating then the first. The second group of Strategists say that America is getting itself into a quagmire in Afghanistan. They argue that America should have focused on a war of global strategy, not on taking territory in a nation that is notorious for defeating great powers. Going after money, running more effective propaganda campaigns, targeting terrorist training camps and engaging in covert actions are the kinds of things that are mentioned as correct strategy. As thousands of Taliban sympathizers from Pakistan have streamed across the Afghan border to fight America, and winter has approached with little change in the size of allied territory, the Strategists' position has been strengthened. One of those who are making the argument for the Strategists is John J. Mearsheimer, a professor at the University of Chicago and author of "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics." In a column in the New York Times, Mearsheimer says that America should "use the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which begins in mid-November, as an excuse to halt the bombing campaign and pursue a different strategy." Instead of bombing, it should focus on covert action and sowing dissension within the ranks of the Taliban "by offering carrots — bribes and positions in a new government — to elements that might defect." The differences between the Hawks and Strategists are in full display in Strategist Mearsheimer's column, as he goes after Hawk John McCain for calling on the U.S. to fight with a large number of American ground troops. McCain's plan would make a bad situation worse, among other reasons, because it would be difficult to get the necessary ground forces into Afghanistan, because the Taliban would wage a guerilla war against us and because the Afghan people would fight us as foreign invaders, Mearsheimer argues. "It is unlikely that the United States could win this armed struggle at any reasonable cost." he says. "Afghanistan is ideally suited for guerrilla warfare, as the Soviets discovered in the 1980's." If he and other Strategists are right, then the Hawks have already done harm by pressuring America to commit itself even more to a war that can't be won, focused on conquering territory and overthrowing the Taliban. But it is important to keep in mind that Strategists also warned America against conducting the Gulf War. It is now clear that the Strategists were wrong about that conflict and that the war was the only way to halt Iraq's grand designs on the region. We face the same problem here: if a massive bombing campaign is having trouble dislodging the Taliban, it is hard to believe that Mearsheimer's plan for merely sowing dissension in their ranks will do much good. Unfortunately, it is difficult for the public to judge who is right in these arguments because the Bush administration has tried to manage the war in secret. One result has been a barrage of news coverage in which we are fed indistinguishable stories about the successes of the bombing campaign. Viewers don't have any way to judge the accuracy of these reports and can't really even tell them apart. This policy of secrecy has left the American people and informed critics out of the loop, and made it difficult for democratic debate to help correct the government's course and enlarge its perspective. The columnist Richard Cohen has articulated some of the anger over the Bush administration's lack of candor about the war in the Washington Post. "At the Pentagon, the briefings more and more resemble the ones conducted daily during the Vietnam War," he writes. "It is Vietnam that haunts the military -- not only the fear of a quagmire but the concurrent fear and loathing of a critical press. But it is another aspect of Vietnam that should haunt both the military and its civilian bosses -- the erosion of trust. As the war dragged on, little the brass said was taken at face value." By way of example, Cohen refers to an article by Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker. In the article, Hersh claims the U.S. military gave misleading information about an operation in Afghanistan involving Army Rangers and a squad from the Delta Force. The operation, which the military said took place without significant interference, actually involved the wounding of twelve soldiers, according to Hersh. Cohen continues: "What's more, Hersh says that the Ranger operation was mostly a PR effort. The Rangers dropped onto a Taliban airfield only after it was determined that the enemy was gone. This was the raid that was videotaped with excerpts shown on television. Needless to say, the Pentagon -- as it sometimes did in Vietnam -- disputes Hersh." None of this, of course, is good news. The first thing we need to do to correct it is pressure the administration to be more open with the American people. That will make it possible for a democratic debate to help guide our course. The current degree of secrecy isn't only undemocratic; it may also be detracting from our credibility and hurting our effort to win the war.
Mearsheimer responds: Dear Mr. Sanes, Thank you for your piece, which is an excellent summary of the debate. I would note that I was not opposed to the Gulf War, and indeed I was one of two or three people who said publicly that we would win the war in less than a week and would suffer less than a 1,000 casualties. See "Liberation in Less Than a Week," New York Times, Feb. 8, 1991, and "A War the US Can Win -- Decisively." Chicago Tribune, January 15, 1991. Of course, this is not proof that I am right this time. With good wishes. John Mearsheimer.
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